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ABSTRACT 
Popularity is the act of being liked. In Popularity: A Bridge Between Classical 
and Behavioral Finance, authors Roger Ibbotson, Thomas Idzorek, Paul Kaplan, 
and James Xiong (hereafter IIDX) explore the concept of Popularity in capital 
market theory. IIDX argue that certain companies have Popular characteristics 
that leads to overpricing caused by a Popularity premium. This paper begins 
with an overview of the historical methods of asset pricing, starting with the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It progresses through the expansion of 
the model by financial theorists such as Eugene Fama and Kenneth French. Jay 
Ritter (1991) has documented the short-term overpricing and long-term 
underpricing phenomenon’s in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market. 
However, the explanation for this anomaly is widely up for debate. After 
evaluating the prior theories, this paper argues a new explanation: short-term 
underpricing and long-term overpricing are a result of Popular characteristics 
in IPO firms. A set of twelve IPO firms across three different time periods are 
examined for their first-day “pop” return, along with their proceeding long-
term returns. While the results of this study are inconclusive, evidence is 
found that Popularity may cause these short-term underpricing followed by 
long-term overpricing in the IPO market. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Popularity, Initial Public Offering, Behavioral Finance, PAPM, CAPM, 
Hot Issue Markets, Classical Finance 
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POPULARITY 
Overview 
 Popularity is a phrase first coined by Roger Ibbotson and Thomas Idzorek in 2014 in 
their article “Dimensions of Popularity.” They describe it as another word for demand, and 
that different securities contain more favorable characteristics toward investors. This is a 
relatively new financial theory, and many have come before it. This section will discuss 
work that authors Roger Ibbotson, Thomas Idzorek, Paul Kaplan, and James Xiong 
(hereafter, IIKX) have done in their 2018 book Popularity: A Bridge between Classical and 
Behavioral Finance. 
 The Popularity concept combines concepts from both the classical and behavioral 
aspects of financial theory. The classical characteristics can be summarized by risks, which 
include any frictions that would drive a rational investor to be averse from particular 
securities, such as catastrophic events. The second is frictional characteristics of a security, 
such as taxes, trading costs, and asset divisibility. The attributes of behavioral finance 
include psychological impacts, which include preliminary biases such as purchasing a stock 
because it has a low impact on climate change. Another is cognitive errors that investors 
make when they misinterpret information of a stock, such as overvaluing a brand’s value 
that is already built into the market price. 
This section begins with an overview of classical finance, followed by the 
explanation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French Three-Factor 
model, and the Net Equilibrium theory. Following this is a summary of behavioral finance, 
and this section concludes with a study of the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM). The 
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goal of this section is to set a foundational background of the theories and models that the 
PAPM expands upon and allow for more context in the case studies. 
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Classical Finance 
 Under traditional financial theory, analysts and scholars operate under the 
assumption that all investors are both rational and fully informed. This includes the idea 
that investors focus solely on the risk and expected return of an asset, and that any 
preliminary biases held by an investor will be quickly arbitraged out of the market. 
Classical Finance is consistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). There are four 
basic principles in classical finance: rationality, risk-free arbitrage, equilibrium, and 
efficient markets (IIKX 2018). 
 
• Rationality: The principle that all investors use logical decision-making to determine 
the price of an asset, such as cash flows, expected return, and risk. Characteristics 
such as liquidity and tax efficiency are assumed away due to the non-risk aspects of 
investments. 
• Risk-free arbitrage: The “law of one price.” It assumes that subtracting transaction 
costs, any two assets with the same value, should have the same price. 
• Equilibrium: The assumption that “supply equals demand.” This means that 
investors are currently holding the exact amount of the security they desire at the 
specified price. Frictionless equilibrium assumes no transaction costs, and therefore 
there are no opportunities for a risk-free arbitrage. 
• Efficient Capital Markets Theory: Written about by Eugene Fama in 1970 and is 
described as “prices ‘fully reflect’ available information” (Fama 1970). That said, 
Fama also notes that “fully reflect” is a loose term, and to be able to test whether a 
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market is efficient, this hypothesis must have a different model to explain this 
parity. 
 
 In classical finance, most models assume rationality and efficient markets. The main 
difference is risk-free arbitrage versus equilibrium. Models such as the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) (Ross 1976), along with the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Black and 
Scholes 1973), assume risk-free arbitrage opportunities and the possibility of finding two 
assets with an equal payout but different price. The next sections will look at the 
equilibrium-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French Three-Factor 
Model. An overview of Behavioral Finance will proceed before summaries of New 
Equilibrium Theory (NET), and finally, the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM).  
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Background 
 The most well-known classical finance equilibrium model is the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), first written about by William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner 
(1965). This model has been widely used to assess both the cost of capital for firms and 
evaluating management portfolios. The model bears intuitive and straightforward 
characteristics of asset pricing that can be widely applied, with the underlying observation 
that the relationship between risk and return is linear. It operates under four key 
assumptions – that individual investors are price takers, there is a single-period investment 
horizon, investments are limited to traded financial assets, and that there are no taxes or 
transaction costs. 
 Another popular model before the CAPM was the dividend discount model (DDM) 
(Gordon 1963). The DDM was a method of valuing a company’s stock prices based on the 
theory that it is worth the sum of all future dividend payments, discounted back to its 
present value. This model presented advantages in the way of a simple justification and no 
subjectivity – in other words, there is no ambiguity in the DDM. On the other hand, it fails to 
recognize systematic risk (beta), which limits its use in the real world. Beta is an important 
variable because it cannot be observed and, therefore, cannot be completely mitigated. 
 The CAPM adds to the model of portfolio choice, often called the mean-variance 
model, developed by Harry Markowitz (1959). This model assumes the requirements of 
classical finance where investors are risk-averse, and that they care only about the mean 
and variance of their one-period investment. As a result, investors select a “mean-variance-
efficient” portfolio, which is the portfolio with the lowest deviation, and the highest 
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expected return. Building on this, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) add two assumptions 
to the Markowitz model; The first is that all investors choose one specific market rate, and 
the second is that there is a risk-free rate, which is also the same for all investors in the 
market. 
 
The CAPM formula: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf), where: 
• Ra = Expected return on a security. 
• Rrf = Risk-free rate. 
• Rm = Expected return of the market. 
• βa = The beta of the security. 
Strengths 
 One of the strengths of the CAPM is its ease of use due to the simplicity of the model. 
Given only four variables, it is relatively simple to obtain a working required return for 
given securities. Another advantage of the CAPM is that, contrary to existing models, the 
variable beta accounts for systematic market risk. It also assumes that investors hold a 
diversified portfolio, eliminating the need for a variable of unsystematic 
(company/industry-specific) risk. 
Shortcomings 
 The most significant shortcoming in the model is the difficulty in conducting a valid 
test of the model (Fama and French 2004). For example, the CAPM states that the risk of 
the security/portfolio must be measured against a relative “market portfolio.” However, 
the process of determining a market rate for the portfolio is widely up for debate. There are 
many interpretations as to what constitutes an assets’ “market portfolio,” as one could 
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include consumer durables, real estate, and human capital, in addition to financial assets. 
Additionally, whether to use the United States common stocks or instead use a worldwide 
market portfolio will also differ the expected return of an asset. Fama and French were 
critics of the model because the assumption of one single risk factor limits the usefulness of 
this model. They found that, on average, only about 70% of a portfolio’s return is explained 
by its beta (Fama and French 1922). 
Conclusion 
 While the CAPM offers a simplistic way to value single-security and portfolio 
returns, there are drawbacks in the model that make it far from being applicable in the 
real-world. These are the assumptions involved in determining key variables such as risk-
free rate, market risk premium, and beta. However, Fama and French expanded the CAPM 
to include two new variables with their three-factor model shown below. 
  
 12 
Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Background 
 The Fama-French Three-Factor model (Fama and French 1992) attempts further to 
determine the required rates of return for a given asset. Fama and French add two new 
variables to the existing CAPM formula stemming from observations about the relationship 
between portfolio returns and market value (size) (Banz 1980), and book-market ratios 
(value) (Bhandari 1988). 
 In 1980, Rolf Banz published a paper to the Journal of Financial Economics that 
displayed an empirical relationship between return and total market value of common 
stocks, specifically in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The core thesis of this 
observation is that smaller firms have historically higher risk-adjusted returns compared 
to larger firms, on average. That said, this effect is not linear in market value; the main 
impact is when comparing tiny firms to large firms, while there is little difference between 
average-sized firms and large firms. In conducting his empirical test, Banz’s sample was all 
stocks quoted on the NYSE for at least five years between 1926-1975. See Appendix 1 for 
the results of this study. 
 The second factor in Fama and French’s model comes from Bhandari’s 1988 study 
evaluating book-market returns. In this study, a positive correlation between stock returns 
and the debt-ratio was discovered after controlling for both beta and firm size. While some 
may argue that debt-ratio is simply a proxy for risk, the relationship was determined to be 
insensitive to variations in market proxy or estimation technique (Bhandari 1988). The 
inclusion of these two concepts led to new variables added to the CAPM formula, size 
(SMB), and value (HML). 
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The Fama-French 3-Factor model: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf) + βSMB + βHML, where: 
• βSMB = return spread of small minus big (SMB) stocks, otherwise known as the size 
effect. 
• βHML = return spread of high minus low (HML) stocks, otherwise known as the value 
effect. 
 
Strengths 
 Like the CAPM, a strength of the Fama-French model is its ease of use. At the same 
time, it effectively applies two new variables to determine the expected return for an asset. 
While the CAPM’s beta is only able to explain an average of 70% of a portfolio’s beta, Fama 
and French (1992) claim that their three-factor model can explain up to 95% of returns for 
a cross-section of equity portfolios of various sizes and styles. This implies that the Fama-
French Three-Factor model is more effective in estimating returns for securities than the 
existing CAPM. 
Shortcomings 
 Problems in this model again include the inability to conduct valid tests given the 
same shortcomings of the CAPM. Additionally, critics argue that HMB and SMB simply 
capture the same risks associated with a beta, or that these are simply persistent mistakes 
made by investors and they do not hold any valid correlations to the return. Fama and 
French published a paper in 1996 in which they discuss a five-factor model, “Multifactor 
Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies.” In it, they reveal that their “main 
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embarrassment” of the three-factor model is that they fail to capture the continuation of 
short-term momentum anomalies. 
Conclusion 
 Fama-French Three-Factor model does an excellent job of providing two new valid 
variables to the CAPM. Still, it lacks the complexity of a model that can be used effectively in 
practice. In the next section, Ibbotson, Diermeier, and Siegel (hereafter, IDS) further build 
on the core CAPM model in their New Equilibrium Theory (NET).  
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Net Equilibrium Theory (NET) 
Background 
 IDS constructed their paper in 1984. The main idea of the framework is, “[the more] 
Investors demand an asset, the more desirable the asset’s characteristics” (IDS 1984). In 
both the CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factor model, this relates to investors desiring an 
asset that has more favorable risk characteristics. However, these models both assume only 
costs that are associated with risk. In the NET, however, IDS expand the previous models 
by including costs associated from all sources – including “various risks, as well as 
taxability, marketability and information costs – affecting all assets in an investor’s 
opportunity set – stocks, bonds, real estate, human capital, venture capital, tangibles and 
intangibles” (IDS 1984). 
 NET does not include a mathematical pricing equation or an analysis of each cost. 
Instead, it uses supply and demand graphical analysis to determine the validity of the 
theory. Instead of viewing supply and demand in terms of demand for capital, they evaluate 
their argument in terms of supply and demand for capital market returns. While all 
investors should have the same proposed preferences in terms of risk and risk-aversion, 
which translates into the same before-cost expected return, investors individually 
determine the price of additional costs, otherwise known as frictional factors. The demand 
curves they present reveals investor preferences for tangible items such as more liquidity, 
less taxation, and so on (IDS 1984). 
In Popularity: A Bridge Between Classical and Behavioral Finance, IIKX (2018) 
expand upon this theory to provide a formal economic model, while further explaining IDS’ 
idea mathematically instead of using supply and demand graphical analysis. In their model, 
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IIKX build on the rational models of both the CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factor to 
include variables involving liquidity and risk anomalies. Higher liquidity is a favorable 
characteristic to investors, because the more liquid their asset, the more likely they are to 
be able to convert the asset into cash quickly. There are many frictional factors in the risk 
anomaly variable, including the following: information costs, search and transaction costs, 
divisibility costs, and miscellaneous factors. 
• Information costs: The costs associated with gathering information on the value of a 
particular asset. 
• Search and transaction costs: Items such as broker fees or agent commissions in 
completing a transaction. 
• Divisibility costs: Associated with larger transactions such as real estate and venture 
capital investments, and indivisibility involves investors having to take on a high 
amount of residual risk to partake in an investment. 
• Miscellaneous Factors: Other factors influencing costs include human capital, 
nonpecuniary costs or benefits, storage, maintenance, or anything else that could 
affect the cost of capital. 
 
The NET formula modeled by IIKX: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf) + βSMB + βHML + βLIQ + βRISKA, where: 
• βLIQ = Return-spread of liquidity for a particular security. 
• βRISKA = Return-spread of risk anomalies for a particular security, given the factors 
above. 
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Strengths 
 NET further progresses existing financial theory by adding non-risk related 
characteristics such as taxability, marketability, and information costs. With the inclusion 
of frictional features, NET gets one step closer to formulating how investors think in terms 
of real-world preferences. 
Shortcomings 
 This theory falls short because it does not include any financial modeling or 
mathematical equations for the characteristics mentioned (before IIKX’s 2018 expansion of 
the argument). Additionally, it lacks behavioral characteristics of investors, which is 
another factor that influences investment decisions.  
Conclusion 
The NET does an excellent job expanding into frictional and non-risk characteristics 
of asset-based investor attitudes. However, IIKX (2018) reiterate that these are a subset of 
classical attributes, ignoring behavioral characteristics/biases. This next section will 
examine these specific biases and idiosyncrasies of behavioral finance that are often 
overlooked by financial models.  
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Behavioral Finance Overview 
Background 
 Since its inception in the 1980s, behavioral finance has attempted to explain biases, 
heuristics, and inefficiencies present in financial markets. The core idea of behavioral 
finance is that not all investors act rationally, and instead hold preliminary biases that 
influence investment decisions. In 2003, Robert Schiller published a paper to the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives detailing the progression of behavioral finance. In it, Schiller argues 
that the concept of efficient markets may work in theory, although there is ongoing 
evidence that not all investors behave rationally. Appendix 2 proves this assumption by 
showing how real stock prices vary significantly from the present values of subsequent real 
dividends. 
Smart Money vs. Ordinary Investors 
 The theories in classical finance, particularly involving efficient capital markets, 
assumes that all investors are both rational and fully informed. However, this theory does 
not work in markets where investors make irrational investment decisions. The thesis 
behind why classical finance works are because “smart money” investors, or those who 
were rational and fully informed, could efficiently capitalize on arbitrage opportunities 
presented by uninformed, irrational “ordinary investors,” which brings the market back to 
equilibrium. However, if this were the case, there would not be market bubbles like the 
tech crash in 2000 or the financial crash in 2008. There were bubbles in the market created 
by irrational preferences, which are explained through behavioral finance. 
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Cognitive Psychology 
 While investors may behave irrationally for a variety of reasons, most involve biases 
that an investor may have. Cognitive biases refer to how an investor may think. Most 
include systematic errors, such as overconfidence or putting too much weight on recent 
experiences, among others (Ritter 2003). These preferences tend to create distortions 
(bubbles) in the market. The following is a shorthand list of some cognitive biases’ 
investors face: 
 
• Heuristics: Individuals investing for retirement typically allocate their funds using 
the 1/N rule, where N is the number of choices for how to invest retirement money. 
For example, if there are three funds, two being equity funds, investors will typically 
invest 2/3 of their funds into stocks (Ritter 2003). 
• Overconfidence: Investors tend to be overconfident in their ability to price stocks. 
This often leads to a lack of diversification among securities. 
• Framing: This involves how particular investment decisions are presented to 
investors. For example, if someone sees that ground beef at a grocer is 80% lean, 
they will be more likely to purchase it than if it were presented as 20% fat. 
• Representativeness: Investors tend to overweight short-term averages, based on 
having recent experience with it. 
• Conservatism: Contrary to representativeness bias, conservatism is when an 
investor does not adjust to a short-term change in structure. However, once this 
change becomes a longer-term trend, they tend to overreact to this change, resulting 
in representativeness bias. 
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• Disposition Effect: This refers to the anomaly where investors decide to avoid paper 
losses by holding their assets for longer durations than if they were to realize a 
paper gain. In an example from Jay Ritter (2003), if someone purchases a stock at 
$30, which then drops to $22 before rising to $28, most people do not want to sell 
until the stock rises above $30. 
 
Supply and Demand Imbalances 
 Other factors that may influence misvaluations come from temporary imbalances in 
supply and demand. An example of this is the increased usage of index funds (Ritter 2003). 
Index funds force a demand shift because an asset’s demand is no longer relative to an 
increase in expected future cash flows. Classical finance would point to arbitrageurs to take 
advantage of this imperfect market. However, the effect can be limited, given restrictions 
like short sales constraints, or “if there is no guarantee that the mispricing will be corrected 
within a reasonable timeframe” (Ritter 2003).  
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Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM) 
Popularity 
 The Popularity concept is a culmination of the theories and models above into one, 
modeled by the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM). Popularity builds on classical 
finance and the NET, stating that investors prefer lower risk and frictional costs for their 
assets. It also includes aspects of behavioral finance, such as different characteristics and 
anomalies that investors prefer and are therefore Popular. For example, while risk is 
Unpopular, liquidity is Popular (Ibbotson and Idzorek 2014). Popularity can also help 
explain temporary market mispricings. The general thesis of this model is that the less 
Popular a security is (based on these characteristics/anomalies), the lower the expected 
price, resulting in a higher expected return. 
 In 2017, Ibbotson and Idzorek expanded upon their Popularity theory in their 
Popularity and Asset Pricing article. In it, they review well-known premiums and anomalies 
across classical and behavioral finance and evaluate if they are consistent with the idea of 
rewarding Unpopular characteristics with positive long-term premiums. These are listed 
below (refer to Appendix 3 for summarization of these characteristics/anomalies): 
 
• The Equity Premium: Additional risks from equities compared to other assets such 
as bonds and risk-free rates implies that stocks are Unpopular from a risk 
perspective, and therefore offer a higher return. This is consistent with the CAPM. 
• The Size Premium: First identified by Banz (1981) and shown in the Fama-French 
Three-Factor model, small-cap equities historically have higher returns than their 
large-cap peers. Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) also mention that in addition to higher 
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risk, small-cap stocks are less liquid and infrequently covered by analysts (resulting 
in higher research costs), which makes them Unpopular. 
• The Value Premium: Fama and French use Bhandari’s 1988 publication to show how 
companies with a higher book-market ratio, and therefore a higher value 
outperform growth stocks. Critics attribute this premium simply to risk 
characteristics, though the relationship is insensitive to variations in market proxy 
or estimation technique. Academics debate explanations for this premium, although 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue, “the value premium (or glam stock 
discount) is the result of systematic suboptimal behavior of typical investors related 
to consistent overconfidence/overestimation of future growth of earnings.” Growth 
stocks are considered Popular and value stocks Unpopular. The result is that growth 
stocks are relatively higher-priced than value stocks. 
• Liquidity: In terms of classical finance, rational investors prefer an asset that is more 
liquid. Amihud and Mendelson have documented in their 1986 article that less-
liquid stocks outperform more-liquid equities. This is in line with Popularity, 
showing that liquidity is Popular, but results in lower returns. 
• Risk Anomalies: Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) bundle severe downside risk premium 
along with the low volatility and low beta anomaly, citing that they work in different 
ways. Investors typically do not like stocks with severe downside risk (shown by 
more negative coskewness), according to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976). However, 
stocks with more negative coskewness yield a higher return. Therefore, the severe 
downside risk is Unpopular, which leads to a higher premium paid for stocks with 
lower negative coskewness. Looking at the low volatility and low beta anomaly, a 
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publication by Baker, Bradley, and Wurger (2011) implies that active institutional 
investors intentionally seek a beta higher than one with hopes of outperforming the 
market. However, this typically results in a lower return. Investors preferring high-
beta stocks means that lower beta and volatility are Unpopular despite an expected 
higher return for these equities, consistent with Popularity. 
• Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG): ESG is the difference between ‘sin’ 
stocks and socially responsible investing (SRI). Stocks with a higher ESG rating are 
typically more Popular to investors. Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) studied the returns 
of ‘sin’ stocks, finding that these equities produced a substantially higher annual 
alpha, arguing that sin stocks typically attract fewer institutional investors and thus 
have less analyst coverage. Higher returns in sin stocks mean that while 
investments with a more excellent ESG ranking tend to be more Popular, they yield 
lower returns. 
• Competitive Advantage, Brand, and Firm Reputation (CABR): Stocks that hold more 
desirable attributes regarding competitive advantage, brand, and reputation, 
typically are more Popular (and therefore overpriced) in the market. This likely has 
to do with the ambiguity around pricing intangible assets such as brand. 
• Momentum: Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) refer to this anomaly as “consistent with 
mispricing, [where] past winners seem to continue to win for a period of time.” An 
example of this could be a breaking news headline that captures the interest and 
attention of investors. While momentum can push a stock price higher in the short 
term, this is usually the result of biases from behavioral finance. Once the price hits 
a peak in price that cannot be justified by fundamentals, the price typically comes 
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crashing down until the price can stabilize at a more justified level. Buying into 
momentum is Popular, despite the ensuing crash that usually occurs once the stock 
price exceeds its fundamental valuation. 
 
Assumptions and Conclusions of the PAPM 
 In their 2018 publication, IIKX expands upon the existing Popularity concept to 
build a financial model for their discovery. In their model, they suggest that a market may 
be “beyond efficient,” resulting in information that is irrelevant to securities reflected in the 
price due to behavior preferences (IIKX 2018). In this model, markets are beyond efficient, 
which leads to biased stock prices. A model that contains and allows for some investors to 
hold premiums that outperform the market, and for some investors to tilt away from these 
premiums, thus underperforming the market, is needed. Assumptions made by the PAPM 
are listed below, along with the conclusions of the model. 
Assumptions of the PAPM (excerpt from IIKX 2018):  
1. Each security has a bundle of characteristics. 
2. Investors have preferences regarding these characteristics in addition to their 
preferences regarding risk and expected return. 
3. All investors use a generalized form of mean-variance optimization that 
incorporates preferences regarding security characteristics. 
4. All investors have the same forecasts; that is, they hold the same capital market 
assumptions (expected returns, standard deviations, and correlations). 
5. All investors agree on what the characteristics of the securities are. 
6. All investors can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate without limit. 
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Conclusions of the PAPM (excerpt from IIKX 2018): 
1. The market portfolio does not maximize the Sharpe ratio among all portfolios of risk 
assets. 
2. Each investor forms a customized portfolio of the risky asset that reflects his or her 
attitudes toward each security characteristic. This portfolio is combined with long 
or short positions in the risk-free asset. Portfolio optimization is required to find the 
overall investor-specific portfolio. 
3. The expected excess return of each security is a linear function of its beta and its 
popularity loadings, which measure the popularity of the security based on its 
characteristics relative to those of the beta-adjusted market portfolio. The 
popularity loadings are multiplied by the popularity premiums, which are 
aggregations of the preferences of the investors regarding the characteristics. In this 
way, the market aggregates investor preferences in determining the influence of 
security characteristics on the expected returns and prices of the securities. 
 
Source: Based on pages 62-63 in IIKX (2018). 
 
Empirical Evidence 
 IIKX (2018) provide empirical evidence by examining the characteristics and 
anomalies of Popularity. Previous literature has not reviewed the aspects of brand value, 
competitive advantage, and company reputation. The final in-depth analysis in this section 
addresses the stock-specific characteristic; severe downside tail risk (Unpopular). 
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IIKX (2018) consider four portfolios formed by splitting the investable universe of 
stocks equally among equally populated quartiles. Quartile 1 contains stocks with the most 
Popular attributes, while Quartile 4 contains stocks with the least Popular attributes. The 
authors note that while a mutually agreed-upon measure of a security’s Popularity does not 
exist, they have identified unstudied characteristics that attempt to serve as proxies of 
Popularity. These proxies include: 
 
• Interbrand’s annual “Best Global Brands” report: Interbrand publishes a list annually 
of the top 100 brands with the highest estimated brand value. 
• Morningstar’s economic moat ratings: Morningstar’s analysts use several factors to 
estimate a company’s competitive advantage rating, then splits each company into 
having either a wide moat, narrow moat, or no moat. A company with a wide moat is 
Popular, while a company with no moat is Unpopular. 
• Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient: This poll measures the reputation of a 
company by consumers through 20 attributes, which form their “reputation 
quotient.” IIKX believes this proxy aligns well with the characteristics that investors 
seek. 
Brand Value 
IIKX (2018) use their quartile methodology along with Interbrand’s brand value for 
the top 50 companies from 2000 to 2017. The growth of $1 for each quartile is in Appendix 
4. As shown, Quartile 4 (lowest brand value) far exceeds the return of the other three 
quartiles and is therefore consistent with the Popularity concept. 
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Competitive Advantage 
 Using Morningstar’s economic moat ratings of an average of 1,039 companies, IIKX 
(2018) discovered that, again consistent with Popularity, companies that had no economic 
moat from July 2002 – August 2017 had the highest level of returns. (Refer to Appendix 5). 
Reputation 
 IIKX (2018), using Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient as a proxy to represent 
the reputation of a company, analyzed the reputation quotient for the top 40 and 50 firms 
in 2000 and 2017, respectively. In it, they find that the performance of companies in 
Quartile 4 has a higher return from April 2000 – August 2017, shown in Appendix 6. 
Tail Risk (Coskewness) 
 Negative coskewness implies that a security will have more substantial losses than 
the market when a crash occurs. Subsequently, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) found that 
investors dislike negative coskewness, therefore rendering it Unpopular. While modeling 
their study after the empirical analysis conducted by Harvey and Siddique (2000), IIKX 
(2018) chose to focus specifically on a 20-year period to evaluate premiums from securities 
with a negative coskewness. 
Starting from January 1991, IIKX (2018) sorted the investable universe of US stocks 
into four quartiles based on their negative coskewness. Quartile 4 (most negative 
coskewness) yielded the highest return as a result of their study. To conclude, based on 
coskewness, IIKX’s (2018) results are consistent with Popularity and inconsistent with the 
risk-return paradigm. See Appendix 7 for a chart of the returns from each quartile. 
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Other Characteristics/Anomalies 
 IIKX (2018) also perform empirical analysis regarding the characteristics of lottery 
stocks, beta and volatility, size, value, liquidity, and momentum. Using ten factors to 
analyze these characteristics, they find that seven out of ten are consistent with Popularity. 
Still, only two are compatible with the classical framework of more risk resulting in higher 
returns. The three factors that were not consistent with Popularity – larger companies 
based on high assets, high revenue, or high net income – are believed to be coupled with 
market capitalization to form valuation ratios (IIKX 2018). This implies that investors are 
unable to agree on whether these characteristics are desirable or undesirable uniformly. 
Overall, while risk is typically Unpopular, IIKX (2018) note that risk can be Popular in 
certain circumstances – though it is likely these characteristics end up dominating the 
approximated returns in the stock market. 
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Conclusion 
 This historical study of past theories shows how Popularity encapsulates the 
concepts from prior models of classical finance and presents the argument that these do 
not work in the real world. Popularity includes investor biases studied in behavioral 
finance that explain the anomalies. By laying out a set of characteristics to evaluate both 
risk and nonrisk characteristics of asset pricing, IIKX (2018) formulates the PAPM model. 
Empirical evidence then determines the viability of this model, as IIKX (2018) finds that the 
PAPM is consistent with the Popularity concept and that there is a negative return to 
Popularity with an associated premium for the favorable characteristics. In doing so, IIKX 
(2018) formulate a model that bridges the gap between classical and behavioral finance. 
The next section looks at anomalies and characteristics of the initial public offering (IPO) 
market. 
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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (IPO) 
Overview 
 An initial public offering (IPO) is the event in which shares of a company sell to both 
institutional and retail investors in the public equity market. IPOs are typically 
underwritten by investment banks that arrange to list shares on a stock exchange. There 
have been extensive studies about pricing these offerings. Jay R. Ritter from the University 
of Illinois is one of the most well-known IPO pricing theorists. Pricing IPOs is extremely 
difficult because there is no “market price” before the listing, and most issuing companies 
have little to no operating history (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 1994). 
 There are three main parties involved in the offering: the issuing company, the 
investment bank, and investors purchasing the offering. A problem in pricing IPOs is due to 
conflicting interests across each party involved. If the price is set too low, the issuing 
company may not get the full amount of capital to fund their business operations. However, 
if the price is too high, the investor may not get their required return to invest. Even worse, 
the investors will become unwilling to purchase IPOs from the investment bank if they 
have a history of overvaluing offerings. Therefore, it is the job of the investment bank to 
ensure that they fairly price the offering to satisfy all ends of the transaction. 
 The next section covers three anomalies in the IPO market. The first is the short-
term underpricing phenomenon, which typically results in high first-day returns for 
investors. The second is the long-term overpricing phenomenon, where IPOs tend to 
underperform the broader market in the long-term. Lastly, the “hot issue” market 
phenomenon will be examined, which takes place when irrational investing during specific 
hot market periods. 
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Short-Term Underpricing Phenomenon 
Overview 
 The average initial (first day) return of IPOs is estimated to be 16.4% (Ritter 1991), 
indicating that initial public offerings are underpriced in the short-term. Financial theorists 
have attempted to examine an explanation for this phenomenon, although there is no clear 
answer. Instead, different theories provide a reason for this occurrence: “The Winner’s 
Curse,” dynamic information acquisition, information cascades, reducing legal liability, and 
enhancing banker relations with investors. 
The Winner’s Curse 
 One possible explanation for the sometimes-severe underpricing of IPOs is due to 
the “Winner’s Curse” phenomenon. When a stock gets issued to the public exchange, 
typically, a fixed number of shares get sold at the offering price (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter 1994). In this scenario, investors are split into two distinct categories: completely 
informed and completely uninformed, referring to knowing the future stock price of an IPO. 
Due to the limit in supply on the number of new shares (owned by the informed investors), 
the uninformed investors will only be able to purchase a limited number of shares owned 
by the informed investors. This leads to the Winner’s Curse because if the uninformed 
investors get all the shares they demand, it is a result of the informed investors not wanting 
those shares. Therefore, uninformed investors will only purchase the offering if it is 
sufficiently underpriced to compensate for this existing bias (Rock 1985). 
Dynamic Information Acquisition 
 Another reason for investment bankers to underprice IPOs is to use the market of 
the uninformed investors to help determine the value of the offering, first written about by 
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Lawrence Benveniste and Paul Spindt (1989). In the article they argue that underpricing is 
a natural consequence of the premarket auction due to the ambiguity surrounding a fair 
market price for a stock that has not yet been in the public market. Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter (1994) agree with this phenomenon and argue that this technique is used by 
investment bankers to get regular investors to reveal their valuations. However, they 
mention that this is a “dynamic” model because investment bankers use an underpriced 
preliminary prospectus valuation to gauge the demand in the market, and then in the final 
prospectus, use their information gathered to make only a partial adjustment to the final 
offer price. Simply put, if the offer price of an IPO is revised upwards, it is likely more 
underpriced, rather than if it is revised downwards. They illustrate this with an example 
from Microsoft in which the preliminary prospectus contained an initial offering of $16-19 
per share, though the final offering price was $21 per share. The stock ended up closing at 
$27.75 on the first day of trading, producing a 32% return (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 
1994). 
Information Cascades 
 Another explanation of underpricing has to do with investors merely not focusing 
on the intrinsic value of a stock, but also whether other investors are interested in 
purchasing (Welch 1992). When investors see no one else purchasing an offering, they may 
decide not to buy the offering themselves, even if they recognize a potential underpricing. 
To prevent this scenario, investment bankers may underprice a new listing to ensure that 
new investors will be interested in purchasing, which will then provoke other investors in a 
chain-reaction. 
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Reducing Legal Liability 
 The Securities Act of 1933 makes all participants in the offer who sign the 
prospectus liable for any material omissions. One way that investment bankers may try to 
reduce this risk of a lawsuit is by underpricing IPOs. However, this theory is open to 
debate. A study by Philip Drake and Michael Vetsuypens in 1993 examined 93 IPOs that 
were sued for misstatements in their IPO prospectus from 1969-1990. The results were 
that the average initial returns of these companies were similar to a control set of firms 
that did not get sued. However, they note a significant limitation of their study is that they 
are unable to observe companies that would have gotten sued had they not underpriced in 
their IPO. However, Janet Alexander (1993) conducted a study of computer companies in 
1983. She discovered that every firm with a $20 million loss in market value got sued for 
approximately 25% of the decline in market value. This implies that underpricing may 
make a difference in the likelihood of a lawsuit and could, therefore, be a consideration for 
investment bankers when pricing an IPO. 
Enhancing Banker Relations with Investors 
 To satisfy the buy-side end of the transaction, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) 
argue that investment bankers will underprice IPOs to entice investors into doing business 
with them in the future, perhaps at a higher price. Similarly, they argue that investment 
bankers take advantage of their market knowledge to intentionally underprice offerings, 
which boosts their reputation and marketing of their own firm, at the issuing firms’ 
expense. A contradiction to this argument is found in a 1989 study by Chris Muscarella and 
Michael Vetsuypens that finds when investment banks themselves go public; they tend to 
underprice their own offerings. 
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Long-Term Overpricing Phenomenon 
Overview 
 While IPOs outperform the market and are underpriced in the short-term, the 
contrary is true in the long-term. Jay Ritter’s 1991 study finds that from 1975-1984 the 
return of 1,526 IPOs from the first day of trading to three years later was 34.5%, compared 
to 61.9% of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Furthermore, Ibbotson (1975) finds that 
IPOs offer excess returns in years one and five but computes a negative return in years two 
through four. One caveat Ibbotson notes is that his sample (120 companies) was not large 
enough, and therefore there is a high standard of error. There is not a simple explanation 
for this anomaly—however, Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter’s 1994 article detail two 
possible answers.  
Excessive Optimism 
 An explanation for the long-term underperformance involves the ambiguity of 
determining an accurate market price for a new offering in its early stages. Because of this, 
optimistic investors may attribute a higher valuation to a company based on growth 
opportunities, even though they may never come to fruition. As time passes, more 
information about the future of an IPOs’ growth opportunities becomes more available, and 
this may reduce the difference in valuations among optimistic and pessimistic investors, 
lowering the market price. 
Impresarios 
 Robert Shiller (1990) compares the underpricing of IPOs by investment bankers to 
create the appearance of excess demand to the promoter of a rock concert trying to make 
an “event” out of the offering. To this end, Schiller argues that IPOs are subject to fads and 
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hype built in the marketplace. This also could relate to the “information cascades” 
underpricing explanation, where investors choose to buy simply because other people are 
buying. As a result, this leads to a lower return when investors decide to sell because they 
see other investors realizing their gains in the aftermarket. 
Conclusion 
Overall, Ritter’s (1991) empirical evidence shows that if an investor were to hold an 
IPO from the end of the first day of trading for three years, the investor would have yielded 
a return of only 83 cents for every dollar invested. There are different interpretations as to 
why IPOs are underpriced in the short-term but overpriced in the long-term. However, 
Ritter (1991) claims that perhaps IPOs are not underpriced in the short-term, but instead, 
the aftermarket is overpriced. Aftermarket overpricing may be caused by the “Hot Issue” 
phenomenon and issuing firms choosing to IPO during specific windows of opportunity in 
the market.  
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Hot Issue Markets 
 “Hot Issue” markets phenomenon was first put into academic research by Roger 
Ibbotson and Jeffrey Jaffe in 1975. “Hot Issue” markets are described as a market having an 
abnormally high return for a specific period. This is a problematic anomaly to rationalize, 
and even more difficult to predict. Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter (1994) explore three 
possible explanations for this phenomenon: changes in firm risk, positive feedback or 
“momentum” strategies, and windows of opportunity. 
Changes in Firm Risk 
 One hypothesis is that riskier IPOs are underpriced to a greater extent than those 
that are less risky (Ritter 1980). This is likely a result of the ambiguity involved in pricing a 
high-risk company with little to no operating history. In this scenario, Ritter (1980) notes 
that there might be periods in which firms with more risk go public, therefore resulting in 
higher returns for those periods. 
Positive Feedback or “Momentum” Strategies” 
 Another theory to explain a hot issue market is that investors follow “positive 
feedback” strategies (Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter 1994). In this scenario, investors 
operate under the assumption that IPOs typically lead to high initial returns based on past 
experiences. If enough investors believe this is the case, it leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy 
of them all bidding up an IPO and riding the momentum that is caused by this only in 
during specific periods when this strategy is effective. 
Windows of Opportunity 
 Hot issue markets may also exist due to issuing firms taking advantage of specific 
periods in time where investors are more willing to purchase an IPO at high valuation 
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multiples. This results in a high volume of new issues and a willingness for issuers to sell 
the offering at below the aftermarket price (Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter 1994). These 
opportunities arise only during periods where the stock market is already performing well, 
and investor sentiment is high, which may lead them to make irrational investing decisions 
based on optimism during a “hot issue” market period. 
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Conclusion 
 The research done thus far draws two main conclusions: IPOs are typically 
underpriced in the short-term, but overpriced in the long-term. A variety of hypotheses 
attempt to address this phenomenon, which includes the investment banker using IPOs as a 
way to impress investors, issuing firms opting to IPO during “hot issue” markets, and 
investors merely being overly-optimistic about companies with little to no operating 
history. In the next section, I propose an explanation to this anomaly using the Popularity 
concept, with IPOs holding specific desirable characteristics to investors resulting in a 
Popularity premium.  
 39 
EXAMINING POPULARITY IN THE IPO MARKET 
Overview 
 First, the progression from the CAPM formula to the Popularity concept was 
examined. Popularity offers a set of investor preferences based on characteristics and 
anomalies of securities. Second, empirical performance in the IPO market and existing 
possible explanations for the irregularities of short-term underpricing and long-term 
overpricing was reviewed. In doing so, parallels between the Popularity concept and the 
performance of the IPO market are evident. 
Further exploration of this observation will attempt to determine whether the 
application of Popularity is valid in the IPO market. Limitations and methods of 
examination are defined for the proceeding case studies. Twelve companies are identified, 
then the Popularity of each is determined, followed by evaluating the short-term and long-
term returns compared to the S&P 500 market index. 
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Limitations 
 Limitations in this study make it difficult to compare to IIKX’s (2018) definition of 
Popularity. IIKX’s research divided the investable universe of stocks into four quartiles 
based on each Popularity attribute, then ranked them from least-preferable to most-
preferable. However, this does not work in the IPO market for specific characteristics, so 
Popularity is derived from a different measure. Some anomalies/components 
unmeasurable in the IPO market are brand value, competitive advantage, and company 
reputation. 
• Brand Value – Brand value is impossible to determine in the IPO market relative to 
IIKX’s definition because companies that IPO are typically young would not appear 
in the Interbrand Annual Top 100 lists. Using brand value as characteristic would 
require the division of brand value into four quartiles for companies that IPO during 
a specified period, which this study does not include. 
• Competitive Advantage – Similarly, Morningstar’s economic moat ratings cannot be 
used sufficiently in the IPO market because Morningstar does not provide a moat 
rating for smaller and private companies that are pre-IPO. 
• Reputation – Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient also cannot be used due to 
the reasons listed above. A reputation quotient for companies before going public 
would need to be studied. 
Other limitations of this study include the inability to accurately attain IPO data 
relative to quartile values for beta and volatility and severe downside risk. Beta 
assumptions can only be estimated, and without prior public market history, an IPO’s 
beta before going to the public would be impossible to calculate. 
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Methodology 
 Testing whether the Popularity concept applies to the IPO market would help 
predict future returns for an issuing firm going public. First, four different IPO’s from three 
different periods were selected. They are classified as such: the “Internet Boom” period 
taking place from 1997-2000, the “Post-Internet Boom” taking place from 2002-2005, and 
the “App” period from 2012-present. It includes the companies listed below: (Note: these 
companies are not randomly selected, but instead are a combination of well-known 
companies and a random mix of less-known companies). 
• Internet Boom: Amazon.com Inc. (1997), eBay Inc. (1998), United Parcel Service 
(1999), Stamps.com (1999) 
• Post-Internet Boom: Netflix Inc. (2002), Axis Capital Holdings (2003), Google Inc. 
(2004), Domino’s Pizza Inc. (2004). 
• App Period: Facebook Inc. (2012), Twitter Inc. (2013), Shake Shack Inc. (2015), Snap 
Inc. (2017) 
Due to the limitations mentioned above, a different measure of Popularity was 
determined. First, fundamental analysis of the company before IPO identifies general 
investor sentiment for each issuing firm. This research involves examining the issuing 
firm’s Form 424B1 Prospectus, along with relevant news articles at the time.  Instead of 
evaluating each issuing firms’ Popularity characteristics, a company's first-day “pop” is the 
proxy to gauge the Popularity of each security at the time of IPO. Specifically, companies 
below the 16.4% average first-day return (Ritter 1991) are Unpopular, while companies 
above 16.4% are to be Popular (with a 100BPS discretion). The issuing period during each 
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firms’ IPO is also accounted for to determine implied investor sentiment that may have 
influenced a first-day “pop.” After evaluating the issuing firms’ fundamental traits, first-day 
returns, and the issuing period, event time formulated returns for one-month, one-year, 
three-years, and five years post-IPO get calculated. The first-day volume versus proceeding 
one-month trading volume is also used to determine Popularity. This data is from Yahoo 
Finance’s Historical Data Database. I hypothesize that the larger a company’s “pop” is on 
the first day, the more overpriced the stock will be in the long-term, resulting in a lower 
return compared to the market. 
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CASE STUDIES 
#1 – Amazon.com (AMZN) 
Company Background 
 Founded in 1994, Amazon.com was originally an online marketplace for books. 
When it filed for IPO in 1997, there was no clear path to profitability. Still, they claimed 
themselves to be “Earth’s Biggest Bookstore” (Amazon Com 1997). In their 1997 
prospectus, they boast about having virtually unlimited shelf space, offering more than 2.5 
million titles. Amazon.com also grew to fame when Time magazine rated one of the 10 
“Best Websites of 1996.” Also, in the prospectus, they highlight the 100% sales growth from 
Q1 1996 through Q1 1997. However, they mention that the company is growing at the 
expense of sacrificing profits. They had incurred $8.8 million in losses in years 1996 and 
1997, which Amazon.com cites as one of their risk factors. 
Issuing Period 
 Amazon.com went public on the cusp of one of the hottest issuing periods 
historically, the dot com boom. Before the bubble burst, investors were excited about any 
company with “dot com” in the name. To understand investor sentiment toward IPOs in 
this period, the average first-day returns on IPOs in 1996 was 17% but had skyrocketed to 
73% by 1999 (Ljungqvist, Wilhelm Jr. 2003). This shift in average first-day returns shows 
how investors were not behaving rationally during this time, which led to vast initial 
underpricing in the IPO market. 
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Findings 
The first day of trading AMZN had volume of 72.16 million compared to a 30-day 
average volume of 9.238 million. As seen in figure 1.1, AMZN had a 29.97% spike on its 
first day of trading (adjusted for return of the S&P 500). Amazon.com’s first-day pop, in 
addition to the information above, means Amazon.com was a highly anticipated IPO and 
should be considered Popular. Due to the short-term underpricing and consideration of 
Amazon.com as a Popular stock at IPO should lead to a lower long-term adjusted return in 
comparison to the broader market. However, this is not the case. While the one-month 
adjusted return was negative (-25.25%), Amazon significantly outperformed the market 
one year, three years, and five years post-IPO. 
Figure 1.1 – Amazon.com’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 15, 1997 – May 15, 2002 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
05/15/1997 
30.67% 0.70% 29.97% 
One Month 
05/15/1997 – 06/15/1997 
-19.15% 6.10% -25.25% 
One Year 
05/15/1997 – 05/15/1998 
294.90% 32.72% 262.18% 
Three Years 
05/15/1997 – 05/15/2000 
2,642.35% 68.78% 2,573.57% 
Five Years 
05/15/1997 – 05/15/2002 
764.29% 30.34% 733.95% 
 
While this is inconsistent with both the Popularity concept and Ritter’s empirical 
evidence regarding the long-term overpricing of IPO’s, Amazon may be considered an 
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anomaly for the adaptation of its business model. In its prospectus, investors may have 
been under the assumption that Amazon would only experience growth through the sale of 
books. However, they quickly adapted their site to sell a variety of different products and 
opened their doors to third-party sellers in 2000. This changed the growth trajectory of the 
company and is what helped turn it into the behemoth company that it is today. 
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#2 – eBay Inc. (EBAY) 
Company Background 
 On September 24, 1998, eBay Inc. filed for IPO. At the time, the company was “the 
world’s largest and most popular person-to-person trading community on the Internet” 
(eBay Inc. 1998). eBay was one of the first companies to create an online marketplace for 
both buyers and sellers, using an auction format for users to sell a variety of goods on the 
site. Before IPO, eBay was just three years old but had already conducted over 15 million 
auctions with gross merchandise sales of $340 million. The company was able to leverage 
the technology provided through the Internet to reduce inefficiencies in marketplace 
transactions. With only three years of operating experience, the company highlighted its 
short lifespan as a potential risk factor in the prospectus. That said, in comparison to 
Amazon.com, eBay was cash-flow positive pre-IPO, which made investors particularly 
interested in the company. 
Issuing Period 
 Despite issuing about 18 months after Amazon.com, the market was still craving 
IPO’s, particularly Internet firms. This made eBay an attractive offering, especially given 
their existing profits, which was unique for a high-growth Internet company. A unique 
aspect of both eBay and Amazon.com is that they went public right before the height of the 
dot com boom, which occurred between 1999-2000. According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
Jr. (2003), high-tech companies accounted for about one-third of IPO’s between 1996-1998 
but had risen to one-half in 1999-2000. The Popularity of tech IPO’s in the market was 
growing over the same period that eBay went public. 
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Findings 
 On its first day of trading, eBay Inc. shares had a volume north of 518 million, 
compared with its first-month average of 72.50 million. While investors typically trade a 
stock more on the date of its IPO, this is still representative of the amount of anticipation 
leading up to eBay’s IPO. On the first day of trading, shares spiked 162.94% from $18 to 
$47.33 per share. eBay was already a profit-generating and high-growth company at the 
time of IPO, and their first-day pop makes eBay Inc. Popular. Therefore, the consistent 
Popularity theory suggests that eBay is overpriced in its offering and should underperform 
the market in the long-term. As seen in figure 2.1, this is not the case, as eBay cumulatively 
outperformed the S&P 500 by 1,304.92% over the five years post-IPO. eBay was close to a 
return similar to the S&P 500 one-month after trading. 
Figure 2.1 – eBay Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns September 24, 1998 – September 
24, 2003 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
09/24/1998 
162.94% -2.19% 165.13% 
One Month 
09/24/1998 – 10/24/1998 
6.02% 2.68% 3.34% 
One Year 
09/24/1998 – 09/24/1999 
825.30% 22.50% 802.80% 
Three Years 
09/24/1998 – 09/24/2001 
455.42% -3.77% 459.19% 
Five Years 
09/24/1998 – 09/24/2003 
1,303.61% -1.31% 1,304.92% 
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 eBay’s outperformance has to do more with the anomalistic nature of the issuing 
firm than typical tendencies in the IPO market. While many companies failed to survive the 
dot com bubble, eBay was one of few companies that persevered through the crash. This 
may have to do with the fact that eBay was already the largest auction site during the boom 
and was, therefore, able to achieve a critical mass of users before the market plunged and 
investor sentiment turned away from tech-IPOs. In the cases of Amazon and eBay, both 
filed for IPO just before the red-hot issuing period of 1999-2000. A compelling study in the 
future may be to evaluate the returns of IPOs filed just before a hot issue period to 
determine if investors can achieve superior long-term performance during these periods. 
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#3 – United Parcel Service (UPS) 
Company Background 
The United Parcel Service (UPS), founded in 1907, went public nearly a century later 
in 1999. By this time, the company had grown into the world’s largest package delivery 
company (United Parcel 1999). In 1998 the company had over 330,000 employees and 
delivered over three billion packages, resulting in revenue of $24.8 billion and a net income 
of $1.7 billion. Being one of the first privatized delivery companies, UPS had an economic 
moat in an industry that is exceptionally capitally intensive. In their prospectus, they cite 
that their main strategies for growth will come from expanding their domestic business, 
along with leveraging their technology to create an advantage for customers to choose 
them for e-commerce. 
Issuing Period 
 UPS issued near the height of the dot com bubble in 1999 when the market was 
overly excited about IPOs. The average return on IPOs in 1999 was 73% (Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm Jr. 2003), which makes UPS’ 36% first-day return look modest. While UPS itself 
was not an e-commerce company, its role as a package delivery service may have 
influenced investor excitement as they believed UPS could capitalize on this growing 
industry. 
Findings 
 On the first day of trading, UPS stock soared to close 36% above its IPO price. 
Volume for the day was 80.8 million, nearly ten times higher than the proceeding one-
month average of 8.6 million. At the time, UPS would be considered a Popular IPO, due to 
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its first-day pop and the growth potential of the company. What may have enticed investors 
additionally was that the company was already profitable and was well-established. While 
the existing maturity of a company can sometimes lower investor expectations about 
growth, the correlation of their delivery service to the Internet likely refuted this distaste. 
Figure 3.1 – United Parcel Services’ Raw and Adjusted Returns November 11, 1999 – 
November 11, 2004 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
11/10/1999 
36% 0.60% 35.40% 
One Month 
11/10/1999 – 12/10/1999 
-3.11% 2.52% -5.63% 
One Year 
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2000 
-14.10% 1.94% -16.04% 
Three Years 
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2002 
-8.66% -34.86% 26.2% 
Five Years 
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2004 
20.50% -15.24% 35.74% 
 
 However, contrary to both eBay and Amazon, UPS offered a negative one-year 
return even while the S&P 500 produced a positive return, which may hint at an 
overpricing on its IPO date due to its popularity (see figure 3.1). On the contrary, UPS 
outperformed the broader market by 26.2% and 35.74% three years and five years post-
IPO, respectively. While this is inconsistent with Popularity, this may be because of the 
overall market downturn, rather than UPS’ outperformance. Additionally, investors may 
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have still considered it a favorable investment due to its growth potential and consistent 
profitability relative to other companies in the market. 
  
 52 
#4 – Stamps.com (STMP) 
Company Background 
 At the time of IPO in 1999, Stamps.com had no revenue; the first such case reviewed 
in this paper. However, its business plan was to operate a variety of product and service 
lines, selling mainly USPS stamps and postage at a discounted rate and charging a monthly 
service fee. The stamps and postage were to be printable from the users' accounts online. 
In their prospectus, they note the most significant risk factor is that their product was not 
yet approved by USPS, which is crucial to their business model. That said, Stamps.com they 
believe that USPS will approve their software-based service (Stamps.com 1999). From 
January 9, 1998 – March 31, 1998, Stamps.com suffered an operating loss of $363 million. 
Their growth strategy was to be the leading provider in convenient, cost-effective, and easy 
use Internet software to provide postage services. 
Issuing Period 
 Filing for IPO on June 25, 1999, Stamps.com issued during what many consider to be 
the height of the dot com bubble. The market was in favor of Internet companies at the 
time, and Stamps.com fit perfectly into this criterion. Additionally, they would be able to 
capitalize on the increased growth in the Internet and e-commerce space, which led to 
excitement for investors. 
Findings 
 On the day of its public offering, Stamps.com had over three million in trading 
volume, more than three times their proceeding one-month average of 996 thousand. As a 
result, the stock price increased by 148.91% (see figure 4.1). This, in addition to the growth 
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opportunities mentioned above, leads to the belief that Stamps.com was a Popular IPO 
issuing in a period of irrational investor behavior. Stamps.com should experience 
underpricing in the short-term that will ultimately lead to overpricing in the long-term. 
Figure 4.1 – Stamps.com’s Raw and Adjusted Returns June 25, 1999 – June 25, 2004 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
06/25/1999 
148.91% -0.04% 148.95% 
One Month 
06/25/1999 – 07/25/1999 
222.32% 3.13% 219.19% 
One Year 
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2000 
-34.23% 9.55% -43.78% 
Three Years 
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2002 
-68.59% -25.81% -42.78% 
Five Years 
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2004 
-62.13% -13.31% -48.82% 
 
 As seen in figure 4.1, this was the case. Stamps.com substantially outperformed the 
S&P 500 in both first day and one-month returns, up nearly 220 percent by July 25, 1999. 
However, even as the market performed well throughout the following year, Stamps.com’s 
stock price fell 34.23 percent. This trend continued throughout their three-year and five-
year adjusted returns, as the stock closed -62.13 percent down from its first day of trading 
on June 25, 2004. This is the first case that is consistent with both Ritter’s IPO long-term 
overpricing theory in addition to the Popularity concept. This may be due to the timing of 
the IPO, along with Stamps.com’s business model. Stamps.com utilized this hot issuing 
period to raise capital despite having no prior revenues. Once investors began behaving 
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rationally, they found that they underestimated the risks associated with investing in a 
company in its pre-revenue stages. This led to a contraction in investments, ultimately 
lowering the stock price in the long-term. 
  
 55 
#5 – Netflix Inc. (NFLX) 
Company Background 
 Netflix began in 1997, but by the time of its IPO was the largest online 
entertainment subscription service in the United States with more than 600,000 customers. 
At the time, Netflix’s core business model was physically shipping DVD’s and VCR’s to 
consumers in exchange for a monthly fee. In their 2002 prospectus, they cite that their 
growth is driven by their large selection, high customer satisfaction, and rapid adoption of 
DVD players (Netflix Inc., 2002). Their primary belief was that without owning physical 
stores, they could cut costs and create a scalable product to expand their subscriber base 
quickly. In the year ended December 31, 2001, Netflix had more than $75 million in sales 
but operated at a net loss of $38.6 million. 
Issuing Period 
 In 2002, investors had just come out of the shaky dot com bubble, which was fresh 
in their minds. A 2002 article written by Steve Gelsi for MarketWatch notes that 
“Technology deals are few and far between in the IPO market nowadays –.” He adds that 
big IPO deals for investors are “still parse” (Gelsi 2002). This article sheds light on the 
behavioral thinking of investors at the time. The issuing period was far from hot, and it was 
difficult to find technology companies filing for IPO at all. This was a far stretch from where 
the market had been just a few years earlier. 
Findings 
 On May 23, 2002, Netflix went public and had a volume of 105 million, compared to 
an average size of 9.5 million for the following month. While the volume had spiked, 
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Netflix’s share price only jumped 12.00% on the day of IPO (see figure 5.1), a modest 
return compared to those seen during the dot com bubble. That said, it came less than a 
year after a recession in which the market pulled back on sentiment for technology IPOs. 
Given implied investor sentiment, along with Netflix earning a lower than the historical 
average (16.4%) on its first-day pop, Netflix was Unpopular. As a result, the stock price is 
undervalued in the short-term and will lead to a higher long-term return. 
Figure 5.1 – Netflix Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 23, 2002 – May 23, 2007 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
05/23/2002 
12.00% 1.02% 10.98% 
One Month 
05/23/2002 – 06/23/2002 
-18.33% -8.92% -9.41% 
One Year 
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2003 
31.67% -14.07% 45.74% 
Three Years 
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2005 
85.00% 9.93% 75.07% 
Five Years 
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2007 
174.17% 40.34% 133.83% 
 
 In the case of Netflix, this was what happened. After suffering a one-month adjusted 
return of -9.41%, Netflix’s stock price bounced back in years one, three, and five to 
significantly outperform the broader market by 45.74%, 75.07%, and 133.83%, 
respectively. While this fits the Popularity concept, other stock-specific characteristics may 
have also influenced this result. Specifically, in their prospectus, Netflix makes no note 
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about the potential move to an online streaming service. Once this occurred, scaling was 
much more achievable, and operating costs reduced drastically.  
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#6 – Axis Capital Holdings LTD (AXS) 
Company Background 
 Founded in 2001, Axis Capital provides specialty lines insurance and treaty 
reinsurance, headquartered in Bermuda. In their 2003 prospectus, Axis Capital notes that 
they had $1.1 billion in gross premiums and generated net income of $107.1 million. 
Specialty lines insurance relates to risks involved in items such as terrorism, marine and 
aviation war threat, and political uncertainties, among others. Axis Capital also highlight 
their strategies, which include managing a diverse portfolio of specialty risks and highly 
disciplined underwriting practices. 
Issuing Period 
 As mentioned in the above Netflix case, the market was still recovering from the 
irrationality during the dot com boom. That said, Axis Capital’s July 2003 IPO was a little 
more than a year removed from Netflix. In this time, David Westenberg of WilmerHale 
notes in an article that while there were only seven IPOs in the United States in the first half 
of 2003, there were 64 in the following six months. Of the IPOs in 2003, 21 percent were 
offerings by financial services and insurance companies (Westenberg 2004). Additionally, 
56 of the 71 IPOs in 2003 traded at or above their offering price by year-end. Overall, the 
market sentiment toward IPOs appeared to be trending upward in the latter half of the 
year. 
Findings 
 Axis Capital traded with a volume of 11.6 million during its first day of trading (July 
01, 2003), higher than its proceeding one-month average volume of one million. 
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Additionally, the price jumped 16.14% during its first day of trading, much higher than the 
broader market return of only 0.80%. My initial thesis was that Axis Capital was 
Unpopular. However, given its first-day pop that is only 26 BPS from the average and 
growing implied investor sentiment in the IPO market in the second half of 2003, it appears 
that Axis was, in fact, Popular. Therefore, Axis should be underpriced in the short-term but 
overvalued in the long-term. 
Figure 6.1 – Axis Capital Holdings’ Raw and Adjusted Returns July 01, 2003 – July 01, 
2008 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
07/01/2003 
16.14% 0.80% 15.34% 
One Month 
07/01/2003 – 08/01/2003 
-0.20% 0.58% -0.78% 
One Year 
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2004 
9.35% 15.85% -6.50% 
Three Years 
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2006 
14.09% 30.34% -16.25% 
Five Years 
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2008 
17.14% 31.35% -14.21% 
 
 As seen in figure 6.1, this appears to be the case. Axis Capital’s share price 
underperformed the broader market in each period examined after its IPO, which is 
consistent with the Popularity concept. An explanation may be that nothing significantly 
changed from their strategies in the prospectus throughout their first five years operating 
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as a public entity, resulting in decreased investor interest in the company after its first day 
of trading. 
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#7 – Google Inc. - now Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL) 
Company Background 
 Google was founded in 1998 and by 2004 was a global leader in web search and 
advertising. Their revenue model is selling targeted advertisements to advertisers. In 1999 
Google was not profitable; in the year ended December 31, 2003, Google generated $105.6 
in net income on revenues of $1.46 billion (Google Inc. 2004). At the time, Google still faced 
significant competition from both Microsoft and Yahoo. Additionally, more than 98% of 
their revenue came from advertising, which they mention is a risk if reductions in 
advertising spending took place. 
Issuing Period 
 By 2004, the IPO market was four years removed from the dot com bubble, and the 
IPO market was heating up. A CNN Money article in September 2004 by Mark Gongloff 
notes that new offerings had gained an average 10 percent for the year, outperforming the 
broader market. 2004 also had the most significant number of IPOs since 2000 with 140 
offerings. Overall, the IPO market was in a better place than in recent years, albeit still not 
as hot as the dot com period. 
Findings 
 Google was one of the most highly anticipated IPOs of all time as they were a 
profitable high-growth company with a proven business model. As a result, the company 
had a first-day trading volume of nearly 45 million compared to a proceeding 11 million 
one-month average, as the stock gained an adjusted 18.41 percent. Given the positive 
implied investor sentiment toward the company, in addition to its first-day pop, there is no 
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denying that Google was a Popular IPO. For this reason, they should be underpriced in the 
short-term but overpriced in the long-term. 
Figure 7.1 – Google (Alphabet Inc’s) Raw and Adjusted Returns August 19, 2004 – 
August 19, 2009 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
08/19/2004 
18.05% -0.36% 18.41% 
One Month 
08/19/2004 – 09/19/2004 
17.08% 3.42% 13.66% 
One Year 
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2005 
179.05% 11.77% 167.28% 
Three Years 
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2007 
398.34% 32.51% 365.83% 
Five Years 
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2009 
342.47% -9.31% 351.78% 
 
 As shown in figure 7.1, Google outperformed the broader market in every period 
studied. This is not consistent with the Popularity concept, although this is due to the 
anomalistic nature of Google’s business model. Over the five years post-IPO, Google’s 
competitors struggled to keep up with their explosive gains in market share. Additionally, 
Google expanded its lines of business, as well as acquiring YouTube in 2006. The sheer 
growth of the company was something that Google hinted at in their prospectus, and that is 
likely why the stock never dipped below their IPO price.  
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#8 – Domino’s Pizza Inc. (DPZ) 
Company Background 
 Domino’s Pizza was founded in 1960, although it did not go public until 44 years 
later. By 2004, Domino’s was the number one pizza delivery company in the United States. 
As per their prospectus, Domino’s had $1.33 billion in net revenues resulting in $46 million 
net income for the fiscal year 2003 (Domino’s Pizza 2004). Domino’s most considerable 
strengths were in their growth model (franchises), and their existing profitability pre-IPO. 
However, risks to be considered were its competition in a highly competitive industry, and 
quick changes in consumer preferences could significantly hurt their business. 
Issuing Period 
 Filing just a month before Google Inc., the issuing period was largely heating up. 
Investors were recovering from the shocks post-dot com boom and were willing to get back 
into the market. There was also a recovery in the first-day pop prices, with the average IPO 
gaining 10% on the first day of trading for quarter one – quarter three, 2004 (Gangloff 
2004). 
Findings 
 Domino’s Pizza had a first-day trading volume of 15 million, much higher than their 
proceeding one-month average of 1.4 million. That said, the stock price dropped 3.57 
percent from its initial price. Citing a Forbes article from after-hours on the first day of 
trading, Domino’s Pizza did not deliver a strong IPO. It appears that other than their strong 
brand name, the prospectus did not deliver anything else exciting for investors. Given the 
above evaluation, Domino’s was an Unpopular IPO. If consistent with Popularity, this would 
result in a superior long-term return. 
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Figure 8.1 – Domino’s Pizza Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns July 13, 2004 – July 13, 
2009 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
07/13/2004 
-3.57% -0.07% -3.50% 
One Month 
07/13/2004 – 08/13/2004 
-0.74% -4.51% 3.77% 
One Year 
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2005 
77.04% 9.70% 67.34% 
Three Years 
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2007 
37.33% 36.53% 0.80% 
Five Years 
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2009 
-44.51% -21.16% -23.35% 
 
 In reference to figure 8.1, Domino’s stock experienced volatile adjusted returns 
from one year, three years, and five years post-IPO. One year post-IPO, the company was 
strongly outperforming the S&P 500 benchmark. However, by 2009, DPZ was 
underperforming by nearly 25 percent. It appears that Domino’s returns were inconsistent 
with the Popularity concept as it underperformed in the long-term while also 
underperforming in the short-term. That said, if one were to look beyond the scope of five 
years, Domino’s has dramatically outperformed the broader market starting in 2010, with a 
1,800 percent return from its IPO price to 15 years later. This may imply that the “long-
term” return for a company is not captured within a five-year scope, and further studies 
require a longer timeframe is needed. 
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#9 – Facebook Inc. (FB) 
Company Background 
 Facebook Inc. began in 2004 by founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg. As per their 
2012 prospectus, Facebook is a social networking platform with over 900 million monthly 
active users (MAUs). Facebook leverages its massive user base to serve as a platform for 
advertisers based on their desired demographics from a users’ profile. At the time, it was 
unique for Advertisers to be able to target such specific audiences. The company had a net 
income of $1 billion on nearly $4 billion in revenue for the year ended 2011. One of the 
most considerable uncertainties for Facebook was to be able to maintain relevance in an 
ever-growing competitive market. 
Issuing Period 
 In 2012, the world was just a few years removed from the financial crisis, and the 
economy was in recovery. There were many uncertainties regarding the budget of the 
United States and the European debt crisis. According to Karina Frayter of CNBC in 2011, 
analysts were skeptical of web-based IPOs without proven business models and believed 
that their offerings might disappoint investors. Overall, the market seemed weary from the 
losses suffered during the great recession, and investors were not eager to jump on 
unproven companies. 
Findings 
 Facebook traded with a first-day volume of over 500 million compared with an 
average of 81 million for the month. Despite this, the company only gained a mere 0.61 
percent on its first day. It appears the 2011 predictions were right, and investors were not 
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ready to enter the technology IPO space. Suffice to say that despite Facebook being an 
anticipated IPO, it was Unpopular, and the market was unprepared. According to the 
Popularity concept, this should result in a lower short-term return, followed by a higher 
long-term performance. 
Figure 9.1 – Facebook Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 18, 2012 – May 18, 2012 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
05/18/2012 
0.61% -0.76% 1.37% 
One Month 
05/18/2012 – 06/18/2012 
-21.71% 3.83% -25.54% 
One Year 
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2013 
-31.34% 28.74% -60.08% 
Three Years 
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2015 
111.56% 64.39% 47.17% 
Five Years 
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2017 
278.89% 81.98% 196.91% 
  
 As seen in figure 9.1, the company’s share price had retreated an adjusted 60.08 
percent one year after going public. However, in the following three- and five-year periods, 
Facebook outperformed the market by 47.17 and 196.91 percent, respectively. Facebook’s 
case is consistent with the Popularity concept. When looking for possible explanations 
outside of Popularity, investors may not have understood the high-profit nature of their 
business model. Additionally, with the broader market also performing well, investors may 
have built a more extensive risk tolerance than at the time of IPO, which drew more 
investment into Facebook. 
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#10 – Twitter Inc. (TWTR) 
Company Background 
 Twitter Inc. began in 2006, filing for IPO seven years later in 2013. Like Facebook, 
Twitter is a social networking company. By 2013, the company had accumulated more than 
215 million monthly active users (MAUs). One way that Twitter portrays itself as different 
from Facebook is that they have platform partners such as media outlets that display media 
content. These partners do not directly generate revenue for Twitter but instead allow 
generated network effects to enhance the user experience which increases advertiser 
spend positively. At the time of IPO, Twitter was multiplying, with a 198 percent increase in 
revenue from 2011 to 2012 (Twitter Inc. 2004). However, Twitter was operating at a net 
loss of nearly $80 million in the year ended December 31, 2012. 
Issuing Period 
 A lot changed in the IPO market from 2012 to 2013. Two hundred twenty-two 
companies went public, which was the most since 2000. Technology IPOs made up 45 of 
the 222, with the average first-day “pop” returns at 17% (Keating 2014). Additionally, the 
general market was transitioning into from recovery into expansion and implied investor 
sentiment was high. 2014 was a hot issue period in the IPO market. 
Findings 
 Twitter had a first-day trading volume of 117 million compared to 14.8 million for 
the proceeding month. The stock price also jumped 72.69 percent, making it one of the best 
IPO first-day returns in 2013. Twitter presented an opportunity for investors who may 
have felt that they missed out on Facebook’s IPO, this time in a more robust market. Given 
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their first day spike in trading, Twitter is undoubtedly considered Popular. This means the 
company should be overvalued in the long-term. 
Figure 10.1 – Twitter Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns November 07, 2013 – 
November 07, 2018 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
11/07/2013 
72.69% -1.33% 74.02% 
One Month 
11/07/2013 – 12/07/2013 
0.11% 3.32% -3.21% 
One Year 
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2014 
-10.22% 16.30% -26.52% 
Three Years 
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2016 
-60.00% 22.00% -82% 
Five Years 
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2018 
-23.34% 57.71% -81.05% 
 
 Twitter’s IPO case is consistent with Popularity. As seen in figure 10.1, Twitter only 
outperformed the broader market on its first-day pop and has dropped in each period 
since. While investors may have been excited about the company at the time of IPO, there is 
growing concern about the profitability of Twitter. On the contrary, Facebook performed 
exceedingly well during this time, already having a larger user base and a net income. 
Perhaps investors lost interest in Twitter and shifted attention to Facebook, resulting in a 
large difference in returns. 
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#11 – Shake Shack Inc. (SHAK) 
Company Background 
 Shake Shack was founded in 2004 and went public 11 years later in 2015. Shake 
Shack brands itself as a modern burger chain, serving classic American food such as 
burgers, hot dogs, and shakes. The company’s business model includes a combination of 
both company-owned and franchised locations. At the time of the prospectus Shake Shack 
had a total of 63 stores, 31 being company-owned, five domestically licensed, and 27 
internationally licensed (Shake Shack 2014). Their focus is on building stores in densely 
populated areas such as New York City. Shake Shack mentions that it is in its early stages of 
growth, with plans for 450 company-owned stores and growing their presence 
internationally. In doing so, they also hope to improve same-store sales growth 
significantly as Shake Shack increases its brand awareness. For the fiscal year ended 
December 25, 2013, Shake Shack had revenue of $82.4 million, resulting in net income of 
$5.4 million. Most of this revenue came from sales at their company-owned locations, with 
licensing revenue accounting for only 5 percent of sales. 
Issuing Period 
 The issuing period of 2015 had 170 total IPOs, which was substantially lower from 
2014, where 244 companies went public (Renaissance Capital 2016). The 2015 IPO market 
was a disappointment to investors who were looking for a continuation of the past two 
years of hot issue periods. The average return for IPOs during this period was down two 
percent for the year. When looking for explanations, uncertainties remained in both the 
Federal Reserve and European monetary policies, which likely drove down IPO returns. 
Still, there were winners in this period. Overall, while the market was not a hot issuing 
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period, there is reason to believe that excitement remained in the IPO market stemming 
from significant gains in 2014 and 2015. 
Findings 
 Shake Shack had a first-day trading volume of over 16 million, much higher than its 
proceeding one-month average of 1.5 million. Additionally, the stock had a first day “pop” 
of 108.64 percent, making it one of the best IPOs of 2015. Given the growth opportunities 
of the company, Shake Shack is considered a Popular stock at the time of IPO. This should 
result in a high short-term return, followed by a long-term overpricing. 
Figure 11.1 – Shake Shacks’ Raw and Adjusted Returns January 30, 2015 – January 
30, 2020 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
01/30/2015 
108.64% -1.21% 109.85% 
One Month 
01/30/2015 – 02/30/2015 
-5.99% 5.50% -11.49% 
One Year 
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2016 
-24.66% -2.74% -21.92% 
Three Years 
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2018 
-5.47% 41.48% -46.95% 
Five Years 
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2020 
48.37% 64.08% -15.71% 
 
 As seen in figure 11.1, Shake Shack underperformed the S&P 500 in the following 
four periods examined after its IPO. Even though the stock had gained 48.37 percent five 
years after it went public, Shake Shack’s adjusted return was still lower than the 
 71 
benchmark S&P 500. This is consistent with the Popularity concept, implying that investors 
were overconfident about Shake Shack’s growth opportunities.  
 72 
#12 – Snap Inc. (SNAP) 
Company Background 
 In its 2017 prospectus, Snap Inc. describes itself as a camera company. It launched 
in 2011 as a social networking application. Snapchat is its flagship product, with 158 
million daily active users (DAUs) and 2.5 billion Snaps sent every day (Snap Inc. 2017). In 
addition to their app, Snap also works to develop “Spectacles,” which they view as the 
augmented reality glasses of the future. However, these are not a significant revenue 
stream at the time of the prospectus. Most of Snap’s revenue is generated through 
advertising on the application. For the year ended December 31, 2016, Snap had revenue of 
$400 million, with a net loss of $514 million. While they were not profitable, the company 
detailed considerable growth opportunities for the future. 
Issuing Period 
 By 2017 the markets were now nearly a decade removed from the financial crisis. 
After rough periods in 2015 and 2016, the IPO market appeared to be bouncing back in 
2017. There were a total of 160 IPOs in 2017, led mainly by technology and biotechnology 
companies (Deagon 2017). Overall, 2017 was a hot issue period stemming from new 
excitement given the recovery in the IPO market. 
Findings  
 Snap Inc. had a first-day trading volume of over 217 million, compared to a 
proceeding one-month average of about 47 million. Snap was a highly anticipated IPO with 
investors seeing what they missed out on with Facebook and wanting to reap the benefits. 
As a result, the stock price jumped 44 percent during its first day of trading. Snap Inc. was a 
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Popular IPO given its first day “pop,” along with the anticipation of its public offering. 
According to the Popularity concept, Snap should be overpriced in the long-term. 
Figure 12.1 – Snap Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns March 02, 2017 – March 02, 2020 
Timeframe Return 
Raw S&P 500 Adjusted 
Date of IPO 
03/02/2017 
44.00% -0.54% 44.54% 
One Month 
03/02/2017 – 04/02/2017 
-7.97% -0.81% -7.16% 
One Year 
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2018 
-26.43% 12.99% -39.42% 
Three Years 
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2020 
-41.22% 24.03% -65.25% 
Five Years 
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2022 
Null Null Null 
 
 Snap Inc’s return is consistent with Popularity. As seen in figure 12.1, the company 
underperformed the benchmark in each of the following three periods examined since the 
IPO. Investors may have lost interest post-IPO, as Snapchat suffered consecutive periods of 
declining DAU growth. While figure 12.1 only has data for the first three years of Snap Inc., 
if consistent with Popularity, the company will remain below the benchmark return for the 
five years ending March 02, 2022. I hypothesize that this will be the case. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Out of the twelve cases examined, seven were consistent with the Popularity 
concept. The dot com period had four Popular issuing firms, with two and three in the post 
dot com period and the app period, respectively. A total of nine IPOs studied were Popular, 
compared to three that were Unpopular. When aggregating the data, it appears that the 
Popular IPOs outperformed the Unpopular IPOs in each of the five periods examined, as 
shown in figure 13.1, compared to figure 13.2. However, further analysis of figure 13.1 
shows that both AMZN and EBAY are significant outliers in the data, particularly in years 
three and five. As mentioned in the above cases, these are anomalistic companies, which 
led to the omittance of both issuing firms from figure 13.3. 
Figure 13.1 – Popular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns 
 AMZN EBAY UPS STMP AXS GOOG TWTR SHAK SNAP AVG 
IPO 
Date 
30.0% 165% 35.4% 149% 15.3% 18.4% 74.0% 110% 44.5% 71% 
One 
Month 
-25.3% 3.34% -5.63% 219% -0.78% 13.7% -3.21% -11.5% -7.2% 20% 
One 
Year 
262% 803% -16.0% -43.8% -6.50% 167% -26.5% -21.9% -39% 119% 
Three 
Years 
2,574% 459% 26.2% -42.8% -16.3% 366% -82.0% -47.0% -65% 352% 
Five 
Years 
734 % 1,305% 35.7% -48.8% -14.2% 352% -81.05% -15.7% TBD 283% 
 
Figure 13.2 – Unpopular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns 
 NFLX DPZ FB AVG 
IPO 
Date 
11.0% -3.50% 1.37% 2.95% 
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One 
Month 
-9.41% 3.77% -25.5% -10.4% 
One 
Year 
45.7% 67.3% -60.1% 17.7% 
Three 
Years 
75.1% 0.8% 47.2% 41% 
Five 
Years 
133% -23.4% 197% 102% 
 
Figure 13.3 – Popular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns, Null Outliers 
 UPS STMP AXS GOOG TWTR SHAK SNAP AVG 
IPO 
Date 
35.4% 149% 15.3% 18.4% 74.0% 110% 44.5% 63.8% 
One 
Month 
-5.63% 219% -0.78% 13.7% -3.21% -11.5% -7.2% 29.2% 
One 
Year 
-16.0% -43.8% -6.50% 167% -26.5% -21.9% -39% 1.87% 
Three 
Years 
26.2% -42.8% -16.3% 366% -82.0% -47.0% -65% 19.8% 
Five 
Years 
35.7% -48.8% -14.2% 352% -81.05% -15.7% TBD 38.0% 
 
When adjusting for the outliers in figure 13.3, Popularity is apparent in the results. 
As shown graphically in figure 13.4, the Unpopular stocks produced a low first-day pop 
and a negative one-month return, followed by positive returns one year, three years, and 
five years post-IPO. On the contrary, Popular stocks have a high first-day pop, though fall 
lower in one month and one year returns. Then, they have an increased year three and year 
five return, albeit significantly lower than the unpopular stocks (19.8% versus 41% and 
38% versus 102% in years three and five, respectively). It is important to note that these 
are adjusted returns, so both the Popular and Unpopular IPOs significantly outperformed 
the broader S&P 500 index. 
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Figure 13.4 
 
 While the initial case study data lacks conclusiveness with only seven of twelve 
consistent with Popularity, evaluating the adjusted averages reveals that Popularity is 
apparent in the IPO market. However, it is essential to mention the shortcomings of this 
study, which include a minimal amount of cases (only three Unpopular) and the need to 
omit two out of twelve results. In future studies, it would be useful to evaluate longer-term 
returns. Additionally, a more qualitative set of Popularity characteristics in the IPO market 
may also increase the validity of this examination. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Residual Return against Market Value 
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Appendix 2: Real Stock Prices and Present Values of Subsequent Real 
Dividends (annual data) 
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Appendix 3: Popularity-Based Explanations of Premiums and Anomalies 
Premium/Anomaly 
Characteristic/ 
Dimension of 
Popularity 
Popularity based explanation 
Equity Premium  Stocks are riskier than safe assets. Risk is unpopular.   
Size  Small cap stocks are riskier than large cap stocks, as well as less liquid, less 
well covered, and have lower investment “capacity.” 
Value  Value stocks are often out of favor (unpopular), less well known, and / or 
operating in less glamorous industries.  
Liquidity Investors prefer more liquidity to less. 
Risk Anomalies Severe Downside Risk:  Investors dislike large losses. Low Vol/Beta: 
Active managers prefer high beta stocks in hopes of outperforming 
benchmarks. 
Environmental, Social, 
and Governance (ESG) 
Investors avoid 'sin stocks' and seek out ‘responsible’ investments. 
Competitive Advantage, 
Brand, and Reputation 
Stocks with desirable attributes -- competitive advantage, brand power, or 
firm reputation -- are sought out beyond their economic benefits. 
Momentum Attention causing event creates more interest, increases trading activity 
and liquidity, resulting in an unsustainable virtuous mispricing cycle.  
Source: Based on Exhibit 1 in Idzorek and Ibbotson (2017). 
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Appendix 4: Growth of $1 for Equally Weighted Quartiles Based on 
Interbrand’s BV Rankings, April 2000 – August 2017 (log scale) 
 
 
Source: Based on figure 6.1 in IIKX (2018) 
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Appendix 5: Growth of $1 for the Three Equally Weighted Portfolios Based on 
Morningstar Economic Moat Ratings, July 2002 – August 2017 (log scale) 
 
Source: Based on figure 6.3 in IIKX (2018). 
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Appendix 6: Growth of $1 for the Equally Weighted Quartile Portfolios Based 
on Harris Poll RQs, April 2000 – August 3028 (Log Scale) 
 
Source: Based on figure 6.4 in IIKX (2018). 
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Appendix 7: Growth of $1 for Equally Weighted Quartile Portfolios Based on 
Coskewness, January 1996 – August 2017 (log scale) 
 
Source: Based on figure 6.5 in IIKX (2018). 
